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Quality Signals and Franchising Growth

Abstract
Purpose – The goal of this article is to demonstrate how signaling support
services and contractual arrangements that create value for incumbent
franchisees can help to create value for the whole network by attracting
prospective franchisees.
Design/methodology/approach - Using data from Bond’s Franchising
Report the study analyses franchisors operating between 1994 and 2008
via a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model for an unbalanced
panel of 2,474 franchisors.
Findings – Training, financial assistance, sub-franchising and restrictions
against passive ownership, and the use of area development agreements
are found to be valuable for prospective franchisees. Experience and the
number of company-owned and franchised units also attract prospective
franchisees.
Research implications – Our findings imply that not all value-creating
services and contractual arrangements are interpreted in the same way by
prospective franchisees. Franchisors should offer training and financial
assistance to new franchisees in the early stages of a franchise. They
should also allow sub-franchising but restrict passive ownership and offer
the possibility for area development agreements as contractual
arrangements to appeal to new franchisees. Franchisors should focus not

only on expansion, but should view the chain in a holistic manner by
sustaining and growing both franchised and company-owned units.
Originality/value – The findings contribute to the franchising literature
by providing new evidence on how offering and signaling some contractual
arrangements and support services can help franchisors create value for
incumbent franchisees and can attract new franchisees. Our research
shows that value in franchising is created differently depending on
whether the franchisees are incumbent or prospective.
Keywords – Signaling theory, Franchising, S-D logic, Quality value,
Growth
Paper type – Research paper

Introduction
In a franchise relationship, each party is essential to sustain profitability.
The success of a chain is usually related to whether or not there is a good
relationship between the franchisor and to whether there is chain growth.
The franchisor sells the rights to use the brand name and the franchisee
benefits from the franchise’s reputation and know-how in return for an
initial franchising fee and ongoing royalties. The franchisee manages dayto-day business decisions within the local environment to deliver the
performance and operational standards expected by the franchisor.
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Franchisors, like many firms, offer goods, service activities, information,
experience, and other resources to franchisees to help them manage their
business units. Ideally, both parties should gain value and develop a longterm relationship (Grace and Weaven, 2011).
Value in franchising has seldom been analyzed (Grunhagen and
Dorsch, 2003; Grünhagen et al., 2008; Harmon and Griffiths, 2008; Grace
and Weaven, 2011). Franchisee satisfaction and system growth are closely
related. Therefore, while striving to create value for incumbent
franchisees, franchisors should also attract new partners (i.e.,
franchisees), thus creating value for the entire network (Michael and
Combs, 2008). Consequently, those networks that offer more value
potential will attract more franchisees. For proof, this paper examines the
relationship between signaling system value from the perspective of the
current franchisees and system growth. If current and prospective
franchisees agree on the value in franchising, then all elements
constituting value will contribute to the growth of the system. Previous
research has analyzed from the perspective of the incumbent franchisees
how to invest the franchisors’ resources to create value (Grace and
Weaven, 2011). However, do prospective franchisees perceive value in
the same way as incumbent franchisees? What are the most important
value-creating signals that attract franchisees and increase the size of the
chain?
Based on the Service Dominant logic (S-D logic) perspective and
signaling theory, this article analyzes what quality value cues influence
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chain growth. We analyze a range of franchisor services and contractual
arrangements that, according to the franchising literature, are valuable
from the perspective of the franchisee. These include initial and ongoing
support, disclosure of earnings claims, multi-unit alternatives, and passive
ownership. We also include experience and financial restrictions as cues
that may affect chain growth.
This article makes a singular contribution to the franchising literature
by empirically testing the effect of quality value cues to attract
franchisees. The results should help franchisors understand what
attributes prospective franchisees perceive as valuable, as well as to
understand the consequences of signaling. We apply two different
perspectives, the S-D logic and signaling theory, to explain value creation
in franchising and focus on the role of signaling in understanding how a
firm can reveal its unobservable qualities and values in the context of
franchising. Hence, we investigate the consequences of signaling
resources and assets related to quality value creation in terms of
attracting new franchisees.
This article is organized as follows: First, we present the theoretical
framework explaining the S-D logic and signaling theory. The next section
explains the methodology, followed by the results. We conclude with a
discussion of the results, including the implications, limitations, as well as
avenues for future research.

Theoretical Background
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Two theoretical approaches are used to build our arguments and our
subsequent hypotheses: the S-D logic and signaling theories. Borrowed
from the fields of marketing and entrepreneurship, these provide a milieu
for examining franchising signals in value creation. A short summary of
both approaches follows.

Value creation in franchising and the S-D logic
From a marketing perspective, value, typically defined from the
perspective of the consumer, includes the functional aspects of the
product, and the social, emotional, and relational components (Sheth et
al., 1991; Boksbergen and Melsen, 2011). Value creation is important as
the consequence of offering value to a consumer is a willingness to buy
(McDougall and Levesque, 2000).Therefore, a firm’s success hinges upon
the customer’s perceived value of the product. Relational components
constitute the core of the service marketing literature, generating the S-D
logic (Vargo and Lusch, 2004).
The S-D logic suggests that although goods continue to play an
important role in business, service-driven principles are dominant, where
service is defined as the application of competencies such as knowledge,
skills, and intangible and dynamic resources that create value. Providing
these services for use by another party involves obtaining reciprocal
services (Vargo and Lusch, 2008), which in turn means reciprocal value
creation (Grönroos and Ravald, 2009). Therefore, to create value,
businesses must develop and maintain sustainable long-term
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relationships. As Vargo and Lusch (2008) suggest, the relational
orientation is implicit.
The S-D logic has been mainly analyzed in a B2C context, and there
are many fewer examples in a B2B context (Eggert and Ulaga, 2002;
Grace and Weaven, 2011). Storbacka and Lehtinen (2001) contend that
any firm or partner may become a co-creator of value by offering
assistance. As the partners interact, each party will influence the
perceptions and actions of the other party (Ballantyne and Varey, 2006).
Examples can be found in the B2B context where suppliers may be value
creators to enhance the value of the entire firm (Walter et al., 2001).
Franchising is a suitable context in which to apply the S-D logic.
Franchisees can be viewed as partners or members of a channel.
Satisfaction and the involvement of incumbent franchisees are necessary
preconditions for engagement in the co-creation of network value. This is
highly relevant in franchising due to the co-dependency between the
franchisors and the franchisees. In the case of franchisees, they are more
concerned about the relationship and management of the system
(Gauzente, 2003).
Grace and Weaven (2011) apply this perspective to understand what
creates value from the perspective of incumbent franchisees and to
determine the outcomes of a value-in-use evaluation of franchisor
behavior. Grünhagen and Dorsch (2003) also analyze whether a franchisor
provides value to a franchisee. A franchisee is satisfied with the network if
the franchisor makes decisions based on the success of the business
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concept and the system (Bürkle and Posselt, 2008), the perceived security
of the system, and how franchisors support the products, services, image
consistency, stability of unit operations, franchise unit survival, ongoing
system and network growth (Harmon and Griffiths, 2008; Grünhagen et
al., 2008; Roh and Yoon, 2009; Croonen and Brand, 2011).
Concerns related to franchise survival, ongoing system and network
growth are correlated. Growth increases visibility, is a signal of network
profitability and a key factor that explain survival (Bordonaba-Juste et al.,
2011). As a consequence, it is up to the franchisor to attract new partners.
In order to attract new franchisees, the franchisors can signal the system
potential value (Shane et al., 2006). To do this, the franchisors first need
to know from the franchisees’ perspective what creates value. Previous
research has analyzed how franchisors create value from the incumbent
franchisee’s point of view and how incumbent franchisees assess
franchisors’ strategies to increase their satisfaction (Grünhagen and
Dorsch, 2003; Harmon and Griffiths, 2008; Roh and Yoon 2009; Croonen
and Brand, 2011; Grace and Weaven, 2011). Value creation for incumbent
franchisees is related to how well the franchisors manage the franchise
system and satisfy not only their own interests, but also the interests of
the franchisees. The franchisors can create value by increasing
trustworthiness, transparency, and security through initial support and
assistance and through the disclosure of earnings. Expansion strategies
are important for both present and prospective franchisees (Guilloux et al.,
2004) as is the franchisor’s experience, the size of the system, and the
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finances. From the S-D perspective, the services provided by a franchisor
to its franchisees form a foundation of value-adding activities that go
beyond merely the supply of products for sale to the final consumer.
Intangible assets (such as know-how and flexible operating models) may
provide a competitive advantage, both for the franchisor by attracting
additional franchisees and for the franchisees by providing a successful
business model in their respective geographic areas.

Signaling theory
Signaling, based on economic contracting theory, focuses on the
externalities of market imperfections and informational asymmetries. In
general, a firm that has relevant information to close a transaction must
decide whether and how to provide that information. The party at the
other end of the transaction has to analyze the credibility and its level of
trust in both the offering firm and the provided information (Stiglitz,
2002). Information asymmetries, commonplace in the real world, may
occur because of the type or nature of the information or because of
suspicious or opportunistic behavior by the firms that supply the
information (Nelson 1970; Eisenhardt, 1989). According to Stiglitz (2000),
the asymmetry is related to the quality and intent of the information. The
former refers to when one party is not fully aware of the characteristics of
the other party and the latter refers to the behavior of the other party.
Signaling is used in many businesses, such as industrial
organizations, as well as in finance and management. There has been
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research on how CEOs signal the quality of a firm to attract investors via
financial statements (Zhang and Wierserma, 2009), how employees try to
signal their value in the recruitment process (Suazo et al., 2009), and how
CEOs and the top management signal their characteristics (Lester et al.,
2006). Signaling is also widely used in marketing, such as in pricing
decisions, product campaigns, and advertising, to confirm product or firm
quality, value, or reputation (Herbig, 1996).
Signaling theory has also been applied to franchising (e.g., Gallini
and Lutz, 1992; Dant and Kaufmann, 2003; Michael, 2009). How
entrepreneurs attract resources is a central issue in studies of
entrepreneurship, especially in franchising (Shane et al., 2006; Michael,
2009). Entrepreneurs with high-quality products or services have an
incentive to signal their quality to prospective franchisees. Franchisors
with low-quality products often misrepresent the quality of their offerings
in order to sell their franchises. As a result, management of the adverse
effects of information signaling has an important practical implication for
firms.
The advantages of signaling are many. In all cases, firms, including
those in franchising, seek to increase their profitability and attract the
right partners or customers (Michael, 2009; Shane et al., 2006). Signaling
firm value to future franchisees helps the latter make the right investment
decisions. In franchising research, Gallini and Lutz (1992) and Lafontaine
(1993) describe the signaling devices franchisors use. For example, outlet
ownership is a credible signal of either chain profitability or chain growth.
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Shane et al. (2006) use signaling theory and resource scarcity to examine
factors, such as ownership, monetary or financial arrangements, and
experience, that are important for increasing chain size. More recently,
Michael (2009), in an analysis of earnings claims as a viable signal of firm
profitability, finds that firms make earnings claims due to the low cost of
signaling or in response to the competition.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has yet examined
the effects of wide-range signaling value-creating assets other than
monetary assets. The franchisor may disclose information about the value
provided to its current franchisees, including information about quality and
value. Different methods may be used to signal quality value.

Development of the hypotheses
Signals are data or information that a firm uses to make inferences about
the behavior of the sender of the signals. A true signal should be
transmitted by someone with the ability to change its nature, should
consist of easy-to-acquire extrinsic information, and should provide a basis
for making inferences about the quality and value of the signaled object.
Signals should be clear, unambiguous, and credible and should have a cost
for the firm (Herbig, 1996; Connelly et al., 2011). Franchisors usually
disclose some of their contractual arrangements and the additional
services they provide to their franchisees, which can be regarded as
signals that comply with earlier signaling criteria.
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Based on franchising research, we propose that franchisors can
overcome information asymmetries using these signaling devices as
proxies for potential chain value. Previous research finds that some
services and contractual arrangements that reveal the franchisor’s
strategy and chain management contribute value to his/her relationship
with the present franchisees (Roh and Yoon, 2009; Grace and Weaven
2011; Altinay and Brookes, 2012). We expect these signals to be
positively valued by prospective franchisees, and hence these signals will
contribute to increasing the size of the system and to creating value for
the entire network.

Initial support and business assistance
Providing good initial support and business assistance to current
franchisees is one of the best methods to promote the chain and to recruit
prospective franchisees, who, because they are often inexperienced in
running the business, need to acquire the appropriate knowledge.
Franchisors may guide, motivate, and train prospects because the former
succeed only if the latter also succeed (Maritz and Nieman, 2008).
Therefore, franchisors should provide pre-opening support, such as initial
training, site selection, and lease negotiations. They should also provide
ongoing business assistance through joint advertising and coordinated
marketing and sales programs. Most of the research analyzing franchisee
satisfaction finds that satisfaction reflects the value of the initial support
and business assistance. Satisfied franchisees help build the franchisor’s
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reputation; the value of the chain can be transmitted not only via the
media but by word-of-mouth by current franchisees (Roh and Yoon,
2009).
Although initial support services and business assistance are useful,
they are also costly (Connely et al., 2011). Only profitable and successful
franchise systems can afford to offer and maintain these services (Frazer
and Winzar, 2005). Franchisees regard the franchisors’ investment in their
training and development as an indication of the franchisors’ intentions
and their recognition recognize that initial and ongoing support improves
their skills in running successful businesses. Initial support and business
assistance also increase satisfaction of current franchisees (Frazer and
Winzar, 2005; Michael and Combs, 2008) and help attract potential
franchisees (Altinay and Brooks, 2012). Franchisees tend to benefit more
from a franchisor’s initial assistance and knowledge than from a
franchisor’s ongoing support. Mature franchisees have also ready acquired
sufficient knowledge to operate the business and thus need less franchisor
support (Peterson and Dant, 1990; Dant and Gundlach, 1999). Therefore,
we hypothesize that:

H1: Franchisors who signal that they offer initial and ongoing support
services to their franchisees are more likely to increase the
number of franchised units in their system.

Earnings claims

12

Information on future returns and the profitability of the franchise is
essential for prospective franchisees who are deciding whether or not to
purchase. Earnings claims statements are included in franchise disclosure
documents [(FDD)/Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC)
requirements.] In the broadest sense, earnings claims are defined as
estimates or historical figures detailing the level of sales, expenses, and/or
income that prospective franchisees can expect. Appropriate disclosures,
a prerequisite for successful franchising, can serve as a selling tool
(Sherman and Schaeffer, 2005). Based on signaling theory, only firms
with a good market position, high-quality financial returns, and low
business risks provide earnings disclosures (Michael, 2009). A franchisor
who does not report earnings may be signaling that the brand is not very
valuable (Weaven and Frazer, 2006).
To the best of our knowledge, no research considers earnings claims
as a tool to recruit franchisees. Previous research shows that disclosing
earnings claims may have a positive effect on franchisee satisfaction (Hing
1999) because it shows that the franchisor can manage its franchisees
(Mayer and Davis, 1999; Searle et al., 2011). Additionally, the disclosure
of earnings claims demonstrates that the franchisors pay attention to
franchisee interests and indicates the quality of the business concept
(Vincent and Kaufmann 1996; Michael 2009; Croonen and Brand, 2011).
Disclosure also reflects transparency, which increases trustworthiness in
the franchisor and reveals the quality of the franchise vis-à-vis its
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competitors. Therefore, we propose that disclosure of earnings claims
enhances franchise attraction:

H2: Franchisors who disclose earnings claims are more likely to
increase the number of franchised units in their system.

Multi-unit opportunities
Although franchisees are generally depicted as individuals who own and
manage a single outlet, in most chains multi-unit franchising is a common
practice (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996; Grewal et al., 2011). According to
the S-D logic, a customer can create value by playing an active role at any
stage of product creation (Vargo and Lusch, 2004; Grönroos, 2011). In
our case, franchisees can participate in the expansion of the system.
Weaven and Frazer (2006) suggest that franchisors attract two types of
franchisees. The first wants to be a single-unit franchisee and the second
wants to expand the brand name by owning additional units (sequential
franchising). In the latter case, before joining the chain, the investors will
inquire about the possibility of outlet expansion and running multiple
units. Franchisees can use their knowledge of the system, as well as their
knowledge about the region and its culture, to suggest locations of future
units. This co-creation, whereby franchisors allow franchisee expansion by
providing multi-unit opportunities, signals that the company is assertive
and flexible, and that the business model does not require that the owner
always be on-site. It also suggests that the company is motivated to
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increase its brand name visibility, both nationally and internationally (Alon
et al., 2012; Ni and Alon, 2010)
There are different types of expansion strategies depending on the
franchisor’s level of ownership and control. We differentiate among subfranchising agreements, area development agreements, and the option
offered to single-unit franchisees to open additional outlets. Subfranchising, a type of multi-unit franchising, allows a franchisee to subfranchise the concept to others, whereby the franchisee acts as both the
agent for the franchisor and the principal for the others (Alon et al.,
2012). Sub-franchising increases administrative productivity because it
reduces monitoring costs (Kaufman and Kim, 1995), but it also reduces
control over the brand name, reputation, and the efforts and roles of the
sub-franchisees. Franchise firms with high brand-name recognition should
not sub-franchise (Roh and Andrew, 1999). International chains prefer
owning outlets rather than sub-franchising (Chen, 2010; Combs et al.,
2004). Therefore, signaling a rejection of this option conveys an intention
to protect the value of the brand name and the reputation rather than
merely to achieve rapid expansion.
There are other options for franchisees to use their knowledge and
motivation to benefit both their own interests and those of the chain.
Franchise chains can offer agreements for area development (where a new
franchisee is given the right to open multiple outlets within a specified
area) or for owning more outlets (sequential multi-unit franchisees, where
additional units are granted to the franchisee one by one). The area
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development process is subject to adverse selection problems (Kaufmann
and Dant, 1996), which in turn might increase termination activity.
Offering area development agreements implies that an entrepreneur will
become part of the chain by owning two or more units but will also have
the right to sell to franchisees. This allows rapid expansion but since that
entrepreneur is not necessarily an incumbent franchisee, there is a risk
related to the extent of his knowledge about management of the units. But
if this expansion right is restricted to only “good” franchisees, the
franchisees will be motivated to run the units efficiently in order to obtain
additional units (Bradach, 1995; Kauffmann and Lafontaine, 1994). The
right to open an additional unit should be positively valued by franchisees.
Therefore, offering additional outlets to incumbents, rather than offering
only single-unit franchisees, may be the best way to attract active and at
the same time to protect the brand name, and the reputation, and to
maintain the long-term sustainability of the chain. This in turn may curb
chain expansion. Following previous research, we hypothesize that:

H3: Franchisors who signal that sub-franchising is acceptable are less
likely to increase the number of franchised units in their system.

H4: Franchisors who offer area development agreements are less
likely to attract franchisees.

H5: Franchisors who allow incumbent franchisees to add new outlets
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are more likely to increase the number of franchised units in their
systems.

Passive ownership

When franchisors demonstrate trustworthiness and high-quality operating
systems and other intangible assets through credible commitments, they
attract potential franchisees (Shane and Spell 1998). One such
commitment is related to control of the franchised unit.
By choosing franchising over company-owned outlets, franchisees
become owner-operators instead of employees with a fixed compensation.
When outlets are owned by passive investors who hire managers to run
the units, there are no residual claimant benefits. Passive franchising is
related to sub-franchising (Shane and Spell, 1998) and allows for rapid
growth of the chain (Clarkin and Rosa, 2005). Research suggests that less
passive ownership results in fewer franchise failures (Frazer and Winzar,
2005; Michael and Combs, 2008; Vazquez, 2009) since a lack of control
over the management of the unit leads to a higher likelihood of free-riding
and underinvestment (Shane and Spell, 1998). This positive influence on
franchisee survival occurs because owning the outlet implies a higher
involvement in day-to-day business activities which in turn positively
affects franchisee satisfaction and improves chain-wide performance.
Nearly 75 percent of franchises prohibit or discourage passive ownership
of their outlets (Clarkin et al., 2002). This sends a signal to the market
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that purchasing a franchise involves not only a financial transaction
between a buyer and seller but also requires that the franchisee have good
management skills (Clarkin and Swavely, 2006). Signaling restrictions on
passive ownership shows that franchisors, caring about the chain’s future
profitability, insist that the franchisees remain in charge of business
operations. Such restrictions on passive ownership can be considered a
control mechanism to sustain the stability of the network, the survival of
the franchise unit, and to attract prospective franchisees. Thus, we
hypothesize:

H6: Franchisors who signal a passive-ownership restriction are more
likely to increase the number of franchised units in their system.

Additional cues
Research that looks at the attraction of franchisees under signaling theory
also looks at other aspects that signal value and influence the decision of
prospective franchisees. These include the franchisor’s years of
experience, the number of units in the chain, and the financial aspects of
the chain.
Experience in franchising is a common variable because firms engaged in
franchising for a longer period have better knowledge about the market
and about how to manage the chain. Franchisee perceptions of the
benefits of franchising are based on the proven concept and system. Brand
recognition by consumers and the franchisor’s market longevity are the
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primary reasons to choose a franchise system (Shane et al., 2006; Roh
and Yoon, 2009).
The number of units in the chain provides two types of important
information: the level of investment of the owner via company-owned
units, which represents the level of the franchisor’s trust in the business,
and the number of franchised units, which represents the number of
franchisees who decided to invest. This signals the positive reputation of
the franchise and the profitability of the business. The number of current
users or consumers reflects the success of the product or service.
In addition to the above-mentioned variables, financial restrictions
are also relevant to franchise expansion (Polo-Redondo et al., 2011;
Shane et al., 2006) since fees and royalties can act as self-selection
instruments or as barriers to expansion of the system. This part of the
franchise contract may be a source of conflict between the franchisors and
the franchisees since the amount the franchisees pay for the franchise will
affect his/her profits (Scott, 1995). Research has shown that in the
restaurant industry there is a positive relationship between royalty rates
and franchisee income, suggesting that royalty rates are a signal of
profitability (Michael, 1999, 2009). This is confirmed by the positive
relationship between royalty rates and chain expansion (Polo-Redondo et
al., 2011) Pricing signaling, usually related to product quality, is used as a
signal of reputation (Koistinen and Järvinen, 2009).

Methodology
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Data
To test our hypotheses we use an unbalanced panel of 2,474 U.S.
franchise systems operating between 1994 and 2008. The source for our
data is Bond’s Franchising Report,1 an annual publication that identifies
and provides information about all franchise systems in operation during
the previous year. These data have been used in other recent research
projects on franchising (e.g., Alon et al., 2012).

Measures
Dependent variable
System growth is usually measured by the number of units in the business
(the total of number of franchised and company-owned units) (Blair and
Lafontaine, 2005; Shane et al., 2006), but because we seek to measure the
capacity of the chain to attract franchisees, our dependent variable is the
number of franchised units, calculated as the natural logarithm of the
number of franchised outlets in the system during the year of observation.
Independent variables
To measure initial support services, we use the services offered by the
franchisor, such as days of training, site selection support, lease
negotiation, and financial assistance. Business assistance is measured by
advertising cooperation. Training is measured by the number of days of
the training period. Other services are included as dummy variables.

1

See http://worldfranchising.com/ for more information about the agency collecting the data. It also
publishes an annual list of franchises in print form.
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These variables have also been used in previous research (Frazer and
Winzar, 2005; Michael and Combs, 2008).
Earnings claims disclosure, included in the model, uses a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 or 0 depending on whether or not the franchisor
provides earnings claims.
As for multi-unit opportunities, all three variables are dummies (Ni
and Alon, 2010). Sub-franchising considers whether this alternative is
allowed in the contract; the variable takes a value of 1 if the franchisor
allows a sub-franchising agreement, and 0 if not. Similarly, area
development agreement takes the value of 1 if the franchisor provides
allows this type of expansion alternative, and 0 if not. Adding new outlets
takes the value of 1 if the franchisor allows such an expansion strategy,
and 0 if not.
Franchisors may allow, discourage, or prohibit passive ownership.
Therefore, we created three dummy variables, one for each of the three
alternatives. To avoid multicollinearity problems, one is excluded from the
model and is used as a base to compare the probability of increasing
franchisee attraction compared to the other two options.
We measure the franchising experience as the number of years since
the firm began franchising and include the number of company-owned
units, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of companyowned outlets in the system during the year of observation.
Financial restrictions are measured by the royalty rates, franchise fees,
and franchisees’ initial investment as proxies, in line with prior research
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(e.g., Lafontaine 1993; Shane et al., 2006). We measure royalty rates as
the percentage of sales that franchisees must pay to the franchisor in the
year of observation. If the franchise system reported a range of royalty
rates, we calculate the average rate. Franchise fees are measured as the
portion of the franchisor’s compensation that comes in the form of an
upfront fee. If the franchisor reported a range of fees, we use the mean of
these values. Franchisees’ initial investment is the amount of startup
funds required to open an outlet in the year of observation. If the
franchisor reported a range of investment values, we use the mean of
these values.
In order to control for the effect of economic cycles, we first incorporated
the value of the change in GDP based on information on the website of the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov). We include dummy years
that control for economic issues other than GDP.

Model
Selection correction
Because the failure of a new franchise system precludes its ability to
attract franchisees regardless of its strategic actions, we control for
franchisor failure in our regression models to predict the number of
franchised units. We include a selection correction control in our empirical
analysis to mitigate biases that may result if unobserved factors influence
both the attraction of new franchisees and the termination of franchise
operations (Greene, 2000).The inclusion of a selection-correction control
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variable eliminates an important form of an omitted variable bias that can
create inconsistent estimates of predictor variables. To create this
selection-correction variable (Inverse Mills Ratio), included as a control in
the model that predicts a franchisee’s attraction, we use Lee’s (1983)
generalization of a Heckman selection-correction model2.

Model for the number of franchised units
Previous research that infers the effects from static cross-sectional
analyses has methodological limitations, especially the confounding of firm
unobserved heterogeneity. We propose static panel estimators to explore
the determinants of the number of franchised units. A fixed effects
estimation method is used in longitudinal panel analyses, which allows us
to correlate the unobserved individual effects with the included variables.
We test the model by estimating the System Generalized Method of
Moments model (System GMM), proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and fully developed by Blundell and Bond (1998).

We represent the regression model on the number of franchised units as:

2

In this correction, probabilities for termination of a franchise system are used to generate a sample
correction variable lambda (Lee, 1983). Following Shane et al. (2006), who explain this methodology
in detail, we model the hazard of termination as a function of a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 if the franchisor is headquartered in a state governed by franchising regulations, and 0 otherwise.
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where Xit includes the exogenous explanatory variables (in-training and all
dummy variables: site, cooperation in advertising, financial support, lease
negotiation, earnings claims, sub-franchising, an area development
agreement, additional outlets, not allowing passive ownership, and
discouraging passive ownership,). Yit includes variables that are not strictly
exogenous, such as experience, number of units, investment costs,
franchise fees, and royalty rates. Due to the estimation of the System
GMM and the need for lagged variables, our final simple consists of 1,029
firms.
Tables 1 and 2 show the descriptive statistics and the correlation
matrix of the main variables, distinguishing the categorical variables from
the continuous variables. Most of the franchisors provide cooperation in
advertising, site assistance, and lease negotiation, and more than half
provide financial assistance. All these variables constitute the initial and
ongoing support variables. As previous research (Vincent and Kaufmann
1996; Michael, 2009) shows, a small proportion of franchisors provide
earnings claims and allow sub-franchising. Franchisors prefer to
discourage passive ownership, with 27 percent directly prohibiting it.
There are no problems of multicollinearity among the continuous variables.
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE>
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE>

Results
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Table 3 presents our results. Model C.1 introduces the variables widely
used in previous research and the lagged number of franchised units,
whereas Model C.2 adds the explanatory variables3. Our results suggest
that the lagged number of franchised units has a positive and significant
influence on the current number of franchised units, with a coefficient that
is highly stable in the two estimations. This means that the number of
franchised units in the previous period positively influences current
performance, a result that justifies the use of the GMM estimator in this
part of our analysis. Based on the first model, we find that experience,
franchised units, and company-owned units have a positive effect on
attracting prospective franchisees, whereas financial restrictions have a
non-significant effect.
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE>
In testing the proposed hypotheses, we find that only training and
financial assistance have a positive influence on attracting franchisees,
whereas cooperation in advertising, lease negotiation, and site selection
are not significant. Thus, H1 is only partially confirmed.
We argue that disclosing earnings claims have a positive influence
on the number of franchised units in the chain, but our results indicate a
non-significant relationship, leading to a rejection of H2. In terms of multiunit opportunities, contrary to expectation, permission to use subfranchising has a positive and significant influence on system growth, thus
3

Table 3 also reports the significant m1 and insignificant m2 serial correlation statistics, indicating that
there is no second-order correlation in the level of the residuals. The Sargan and Hansen tests are
also reported and their non-significance validates the robustness of our estimations and the suitability
of our instrumental variables.
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H3 is not supported. Offering area development agreements has a
negative impact on the attraction of new partners, consistent with H4.
However, signaling the possibility that current franchisees can add new
outlets to the system does not have a significant effect on the attraction of
prospective franchisees, and hence H5 is not supported.
Franchisors must also consider whether or not to allow passive
ownership. We proposed that not allowing or discouraging passive
ownership, as opposed to allowing passive ownership, would have a
positive effect on the number of franchised units. The results show that
the coefficients of both variables are positive and significant, in support of
H6.

Discussion
Empirical testing of the model suggests that some signaling devices help
to attract franchisees. According to the S-D logic, these services represent
how franchisors and franchisees create value for the network for both
parties as well as for prospective franchisees. A decision to invest in the
franchise chain is based on the signals the franchisor provides about the
quality of the chain. Based on signaling theory, we propose different
signals or cues that represent the potential value of the chain. Our results
suggest that prospective franchisees place more value on those chains
where the franchisors provide more training and financial assistance,
restrictions on passive ownership, and prohibit area development
agreements. Sub-franchising may be considered a signal of the quality of
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the chain, or reveal the operational flexibility that is desired by
franchisees. Franchisees also take into account the number of owned and
franchised units and the franchise experience.
Our study reports that key operational elements, such as training
and financial assistance, are valuable services for prospective franchisees.
In line with previous research, quality signaling is a costly endeavor
(Connelly et al., 2011; Grace and Weaven, 2011). By offering financial
assistance, franchisors indicate confidence in the chain and their vested
interest in the success of the franchised outlets. Such efforts should
contribute to chain growth. These results are consistent with previous
studies that highlight the critical role of training, a service considered
important for franchisors and franchisees in terms of contributing to chain
growth (Altinay and Brookes, 2012). These services enable the creation of
reciprocal value and generate value for the entire network.
Signaling theory suggests that earnings claims may be a quality
signal (Michael, 2009). Disclosing this information is a way for franchising
firms to differentiate themselves from the competition and to provide
transparency and trustworthiness about the business system, which lowers
the franchisee’s investment risks (Grace and Weaven, 2009; Croonen and
Brand, 2011) and ultimately attracts new franchisees. However, because
American franchisors are not required by law to provide earnings claims, a
majority do not disclose them to prospective franchisees. On the one
hand, incumbent franchisees view this type of information as a signal of
transparency which increases their level of trust and hence contributes to
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their satisfaction. On the other hand, consistent with previous research,
our results show that earning claims disclosures have no effect on the
market (Michael, 2009). Making such a disclosure does not offer a point of
differentiation for prospective franchisees. Michael (2009) shows that
prospective franchisees may invest in a system even when a franchisor
does not disclose earnings information. This could be because prospective
franchisees do not trust the information provided by the franchisor, or
because the information provided is not relevant or appropriate for making
a final decision about whether to invest in the system. Consequently, we
report that franchisees do not regard earnings claims disclosures as a
signal of business quality.
According to the S-D logic, the customer creates value by taking an
active part in any phase of product creation (Vargo and Lusch, 2004;
Grönroos, 2011). In our case, franchisees play an active role in the
expansion of the system. They may suggest the best location for new
establishments because they are better acquainted with their regions
better than the franchisors. This co-creation is also available if franchisors
allow sub-franchising but restrict area development agreements. It is
worth noting that studies of signaling sub-franchising are not common
(Michael, 2009). Only a small percentage of franchisors choose to subfranchise since it is costly to control and to manage sub-franchises as well
as to decide when to offer this opportunity. Contrary to our expectation,
the sub-franchising agreement variable is positively valued by prospective
franchisees, who regard it as a relevant signal about the chain. This may
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be because it is commonly used for international expansion and
prospective franchisees view it as a signal of an assertive and flexible
management that has a positive attitude about opening outlets outside of
the United States, as confirmed by Ni and Alon (2010). However, offering
area development agreements is not regarded as a value signal by
prospective franchisees. In fact, we find that the use of area development
agreements limits growth, possibly because, while sub-franchising is
interpreted as an option for international expansion, area development
agreements may be associated with passive ownership. The area
developer must hire employee-managers to run the business in a specified
area, but the area developer is not allowed to sub-franchise (Teegen,
2000). Further research should examine franchisee views of this strategy.
Franchisors who allow adding new outlets, however, do not attract new,
perhaps because most chains provide this right to incumbents as well. In
this case, prospective franchisees do not receive preferential treatment.
Our findings indicate that restricting passive ownership can serve as
a viable signal of a franchisors’ firm value. Although incumbent franchisees
enjoy system growth, the franchisors have to assure network quality and
success. By restricting passive ownership, franchising firms send a clear
message that they are serious about their business and want their
franchisees to manage their own business operations. Our results suggest
that prospective franchisees positively value this expansion strategy.
Franchisors ultimately seek entrepreneurs who are operators rather than
passive investors, and potential franchisees may consider a restriction of
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passive ownership to be an indication of the long–term viability of the
chain (Vazquez, 2009).
Cues related to the cost or pricing of the franchise chain are not
relevant. This contradicts previous research, not only in the context of
franchising, but also in the context of consumer behavior, that suggests
pricing signals are relevant for consumers (Koisten and Järvinen, 2009)
and are even more important as a signal of quality than retailer reputation
or other signals (Dawar and Parker, 1994; Grace and Weaven, 2011). In
our study, important signals of quality are related to the number of
franchised units, followed by experience and the number of companyowned units. These signals are broadly confirmed in the literature and are
consistent with previous findings (Shane et al., 2006).
Our study makes several distinct contributions to the service
marketing literature, especially franchising research, by revealing which
value creating services and contractual arrangements for incumbent
partners of the network are appreciated by prospective partners. Our
research also contributes to signaling theory by providing evidence of
signals franchisors can use to achieve differentiation in the market. We
find that the more generous a franchisor is in offering value-enhancing
services, such as financial assistance and training, the more likely is the
chain to recruit new franchisees and to experience unit growth. The results
indicate that not all elements that create value for incumbent franchisees
can be used as quality signals to attract franchisees. For example, offering
site selection assistance and lease negotiation services are not valuable for
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new franchisees. Franchisors thus need to manage the expectations of
prospective franchisees about value-adding services.

Implications for managers and executives
For franchisors, a practical implication of our study is that quality signaling
helps attract future franchisees. Based on services and contractual
arrangements that increase the value of the franchise relationship with
current franchisees, franchisors send quality signals that help franchisors
create a competitive advantage in the marketplace. Franchisors must
invest time and managerial attention to their current outlets to
demonstrate quality and value. The quality of the system can be signaled
through different support services.
Franchisors should offer initial support services to differentiate their
firms from their competitors and to signal that they aim to take care of the
whole system and the brand name, without a myopic emphasis on rapid
expansion. To signal this concern, the franchisor can use the restrictions
and controls on passive ownership and area developing agreements and
sub-franchising to enter international markets. Instead of hiring
managers to run the establishments in the system, franchisors should
expand through owners/franchisees to reduce organizational uncertainty.
Franchising firms have to consider the cost of signaling methods as
well as the relative impact of each method since not all signals are created
equal. Executives should maintain close contact with potential franchisees
by regularly asking, by distributing formal questionnaires, what tools and
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assistance prospective franchisees consider valuable. Franchisors should
also consider the strength, frequency, and environment of the signal
(Connelly et al., 2011).
This study has implications for prospective franchisees similar to
those for the franchisors. Since prospective franchisees can choose from
among numerous franchising chains, they should exercise due diligence in
interpreting signals and evaluating the long-term viability of the chains.
Our results conflict with information provided by consultants about
including the financial requirements. Although potential franchisees used
to demand unique information, we show how other cues help evaluate the
quality of a system equally effectively. Potential franchisees must seek
detailed information about the type of multi-unit ownership opportunities
offered in order to understand how the franchisor’s concern about the
whole system. This can help prospective franchisees make wise business
decisions during periods of financial turbulence.

Limitations and future research
This study has several limitations. First, we recognize that signaling theory
includes aspects such as signal duration, strength, and frequency
(Connelly et al., 2011) that are not directly addressed in this study. We
focus on quality signaling to demonstrate how providing support services
helps to create value in a franchising chain, but we do not directly consider
the duration and frequency of these signals.
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Second, even though we report that financial assistance helps firm
growth, we recognize that this variable is categorical and our data do not
provide information about the amount of financial assistance. Similarly, we
include a wide range of different support services, but we do not explore
the quality of the services provided. Future studies should use metric
variables to confirm the positive influence of financial assistance on firm
growth and should include information about the quality of the services
offered instead of categorical variables. Further research should determine
whether the quality or the range of services offered is valued by
prospective franchisees. We also do not include the number of states
where the franchisor operates. As a franchisor expands throughout the
United States or in foreign countries, offering financial assistance and
training becomes more challenging for logistical reasons. Future studies
could investigate which services fuel franchisors’ international growth.
Third, the present study does not control for industry growth. As a
result, it is possible that franchisors in high-growth industries may achieve
systemic growth without incurring costly quality signaling efforts
pertaining to relationship value. But firms in more competitive and mature
industries may have to signal their quality by offering multiple services not
only to maintain their growth rate but also to sustain an advantage over
their competitors.
Our study offers valuable general findings regarding franchising.
However, as Michael (2009) suggests, some issues, such as disclosure of
information, might generate different results and implications if the
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sample were to be divided by sectors. Future research should examine
whether such differences exist. Furthermore, value is a personal
perception and may vary from one customer to another as well as over the
life cycle of the relationship between the firm and the customer (Blut et
al., 2011). Therefore, future research should analyze the dynamic
perceptions of value from the perspective of franchisees.
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